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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the degree of concentration and efficiency in the 
Vietnamese banking system using the structural model. We apply the concentration ratio 
(CR), Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and concentration-profitability model based upon the 
Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) and Efficiency Hypothesis (EH) approaches to examine 
48 Vietnamese commercial banks over the period 1999-2009. This is the first such study of 
the Vietnamese banking system. Our empirical results show that the Vietnamese banking 
industry has become substantially less concentrated, however large commercial banks still 
dominate the whole banking system. Further, our results do not support either the 
traditional Structure-Conduct-Performance or the Efficiency Hypothesis. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Vietnam has become one of Asia's economic success stories in recent years, averaging 
growth of 7.8% a year. During previous years, the banking system provided capital for the 
economy, contributing approximately 16% to 18% of GDP annually which was almost 
equivalent to 50% of the total capital invested in the whole country since the transition in 
1986. Hence, the banking system had developed strongly and played a crucial role as the 
connection between production, consumption, and savings. However, Vietnamese finance 
has had its problems, for example, during the 1997 Asian and 2008 Global crises. The 
domestic banking system still suffers from a lack of capital, inadequate provisions for 
possible loan losses, low profitability, inexperience of the capital markets, low pace of 
institutional reform (Dinh TTH and Kleimeier, 2007) and high dependence on governmental 
policies compared to foreign banks.  
 
The objective of this study is to provide for the first time a comprehensive application of the 
extended structural models to the Vietnamese banking system. Using structural models we 
will examine how profitability is affected by market concentration (Structure-Conduct-
Performance) or market share (Efficiency Hypothesis). The structural model consists of the 
Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) and Efficiency Hypothesis (EH) approaches (Weiss, 
1974; Smirlock, 1985; Lloyd-Williams et al., 1994 and Molyneux and Forbes, 1995). The SCP 
approach examines whether a highly concentrated market causes collusive behaviour among 
large banks and whether it improves market performance. In contrast, the EH approach 
assesses whether efficient behaviour of large banks leads to an improvement in market 
performance.  
 
This paper’s principal contributions are empirical. We employ the concentration-profitability 
model (SCP and EH approaches) to examine 48 Vietnamese commercial banks over the full 
sample (1999–2009) and four sub-samples (1999–2003; 2004–2009; five State Owned 
Commercial Banks (SOCBs) and 43 Non-State Owned Commercial Banks (non-SOCBs)).  No 
previous study of the Vietnamese banking system has used the SCP or EH approach or 
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utilised concentration ratios or HHIs. This is the main contribution of our paper. Further, we 
use 3 measures of market share and the concentration ratio based upon customer deposits, 
total assets and customer loans. For the concentration ratio we also consider 3-bank and 5-
bank ratios. Such a variety of measures have not been employed by previous studies banking 
system studies – see, for example, Barth et al., (2001, 2004). In our models revenue over 
total assets, interest income over total assets and profit before tax over total assets are our 
dependent variables. Other environmental factors such as capital/assets, loans/deposits and 
number of branches are included in the model to account for risks, cost and size.  
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section details developments in the 
Vietnamese banking system in the period from 1986 to 2009 while section 3 contains a brief 
review of the previous empirical literature of the structural model in banking. Section 4 deals 
with methodology and data, empirical results are presented in section 5 and section 6 gives 
conclusions. 
 
2. The Vietnamese banking system during 1986-2009 
 
 
From 1986 to 2009 the Vietnamese banking system was transformed from a mono to two-
tier banking system. The two-tier banking system has the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) as the 
central bank (tier 1) and four specialised state owned banks (tier 2), see Figure 1. The 
Vietnamese banking system was not affected by the 1997 crisis as drastically as other 
countries. The door for free international capital mobility was narrow. Foreign exchange 
transactions were maintained under control. In the 2008 Global crisis, there were still 
economic difficulties due to excessively rapid growth (average 7.8% a year from 2001 to 
2007). These induced the government to concentrate on the regulatory environment. The 
banking system encountered many difficulties, resulting from loss of balance in the source 
and use of funds, and the rapid increase in credit growth. On this basis many banks were 
affected by tightening monetary policy. Compulsory measures were necessary for banks to 
reorganise and strengthen their organisations. 
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Table 1 shows the number of Vietnamese commercial banks from 1990 to 2009. With 
extended networks in almost all provinces and larger cities, SOCBs have a competitive edge 
in providing banking services. Although joint stock commercial banks (JSCBs) increased their 
numbers immediately after their appearance in 1990 (in 2009 there were 37 banks), the 
leading positions in the market still belong to SOCBs. The rising numbers of branches of 
foreign banks (BFBs), from 18 banks in 1995 to 48 banks in 2009, explained the demand for 
foreign companies on banking services. However, each BFB normally has one branch in either 
Hanoi or Ho Chi Minh City. Hence, the assets, loans and deposits are small compared to 
SOCBs and JSCBs. Despite Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in US dollar (USD) terms growing 
eight times from 1990 to 2005, foreign companies are still hesitant as whether or not to 
choose domestic banks when they enter this new market. The number of joint venture 
commercial banks (JVCBs) has slightly increased from four to six banks between 1995 and 
2009.  
 
Figure 2 shows that non-performing loans to outstanding total loans (NPLs/TLs) in the 
Vietnamese banking system increased from 9.3% in 1996 to 13% by the end of 1998, and 
decreased in the next seven years to 2.85% in 2004. The proportion of non-performing loans 
plunged sharply to 3.17% in 2005. Non-performing loans over total loans were quite low in 
this period. With the high development of the economy, non-performing loans decreased 
from 2.6% in 2006 to 1.5% in 2007. Due to the financial crisis in 2008 non-performing loans 
rose to 2.13% in 2008 before falling slightly to 1.99% in 2009. 
 
Table 2 reports Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and concentration ratio (CR) of the 
Vietnamese banking system from 1999 to 2009. The highest CR uses the customer deposits 
measure involving five banks (denoted CR-CD5) which was 92.70% in 1999, suggesting that 
these five banks dominated the banking industry in 1999. By 2009 CR-CD5 had fallen 
dramatically to 60.73%. The corresponding 5-bank CR measured using customer loans, CR-
CL5, (total assets, CR-TA5) also fell steeply from 92.56% (91.75%) in 1999 to 64.59% (57.23%) 
in 2009. Similar substantial declines in CR are also observed for the 3-bank measures based 
on customer deposits (from 72.68% in 1999 to 45.55%
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50.66%) and total assets (69.16% to 40.89%). For all measures the CR fell by approximately 
30 percentage points suggesting a massive reduction in concentration over the period. 
Nevertheless, concentration still remained high in 2009 with all measures of the 
concentration ratio exceeding 40%. The HHI provides the same inferences. They gradually 
reduced from 1999 to 2009 as small and medium sized banks increased their share of 
customer loans, total assets and customer deposits in the system. In 1999, HHI-CL, HHI-TA 
and HHI-CD were 0.2270, 0.2052 and 0.2127, respectively. After 10 years, these indices fell to 
about half of their level in 1999, being 0.1141, 0.0824 and 0.0972, respectively. On the 
whole, the overall downward trend of the CRs and HHIs suggests that the Vietnamese 
banking industry has become notably less concentrated between 1999 and 2009 (the 
reduction is by approximately 10% a year). However, large commercial banks still dominate 
the whole banking system.  
 
There are changes regarding non-SOCBs and SOCBs in terms of customer loans, total assets 
and customer deposits over the period. Non-SOCBs start to expand their total assets and 
offer customers both low-rate loans and high-rate deposits. On the other hand, SOCBs start 
to transform into non-SOCBs. The increase in the number of banks and decreased market 
concentration may suggest that banking service choice is increasing. Indeed, the growth in 
branch networks in many banks appears to reflect this trend. In addition, the growth of non-
traditional banking services (such as through the stock exchange), derivative products, 
internet banking, phone banking, credit cards, ATM and so on also indicate that overall 
choice grew during this period. 
 
3. Measuring performance using the structural model  
 
The structural model consists of the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) and Efficiency 
Hypothesis (EH) approaches. The SCP approach uses a model that can examine whether a 
highly concentrated market causes collusive behaviour among large banks and whether it 
improves market performance. In contrast, the EH approach is used to determine whether 
the efficient behaviour of large banks leads to an improvement in market performance. The 
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difference between the SCP and EH approaches is not in the relationship between market 
structure, conduct and performance, but rather the connection between concentration and 
profit under public intervention to reach a competitive goal. The main idea of the EH is that 
an industry will become more concentrated under competitive conditions if some firms 
expand output. Such expansion will increase the degree of concentration at the same time 
that it increases the rate of return. The result may be better products that satisfy demand at 
a lower cost. In this case efficient firms tend to achieve a larger market share, leading to 
increased concentration of the industry. The success of firms will be reflected in higher 
returns and stock prices, not higher input prices (Demsetz, 1973 and 1974)
3
. After Demsetz a 
number of researchers embraced the EH, for example, McGee (1974), Smirklock (1985), 
Jovanovic (1982), Carter (1978), Brozen (1970) and Phillips (1976) amongst others. Some 
economists were undecided regarding the two approaches, including Schamalensee (1985) 
and Eckard (1995). In essence the EH is a criticism of the SCP approach on concentration, if it 
is still based on the SCP paradigm of explaining structure.  
 
The non-structural method, defines bank structures as perfect competition, monopolistic 
competition or monopoly. Banking researchers might access three characters of market 
structure: concentration, product differentiation and entry barriers. It is widely accepted that 
the measurement of bank performance and the measurement of market structure are 
different but parallel to each other.  
 
In bank performance, profitability (measured as return on assets and return on capital) is the 
preferred performance measure being used 38 times out of 133 cases that are considered 
(Molyneuxet al., 1996). Profitability measures succeed in finding a significant relationship 
between market structure and industry performance. For market structure, concentration is 
commonly used (95 times) due to its easy quantification. Typical profitability-concentration 
studies include Weiss (1974), Smirlock (1985), Rhoades (1985), Berger and Hannan (1989), 
Molyneux and Thornton (1992), Lloyd-Williams et al. (1994)and Molyneux and Forbes (1995). 
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Demsetz is among those from the Chicago School (Stigler, 1968; Posner, 1979; Reder, 1982) that queried a challenge to 
Professor Joe Bain that used another explanation about structure, called the Efficiency Hypothesis (EH). 
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Most of the studies in the USA found evidence of a positive relationship between market 
share and profitability whereas studies in Europe generally suggest a positive relationship 
between concentration and profitability. Smirlock (1985) employed data of 2,700 US banks in 
seven states from 1973 to 1978. The model includes a set of control variables which reflect 
the differences in the size and growth of the banking sector, changes in capital resources, 
bank scale and the alliance with the holding corporation. Smirlock (1985) favoured the 
efficiency hypothesis. Evanoff and Fortier (1988) used data of more than 6,300 US banks in 
30 states in 1984. They examined the effect of regulation on bank performance by dividing 
the market into those with high entry barriers and those with low entry barriers. In markets 
with high entry barriers market share has a strong impact on profitability. However, in 
markets with low entry barriers market growth has a significant and negative effect on bank 
profitability. In general, their results support the efficiency hypothesis. Berger and Hannan 
(1989) analysed data of 470 banks in 195 local US banking markets. They analysed the 
relationship between market concentration and profitability using non-competitive pricing 
behaviour. The empirical evidence indicates a negative link between market concentration 
and deposit interest. In other words, banks in a highly concentrated market exercise market 
power by paying low deposit interest. 
 
Molyneux and Thorton (1992) investigated the determinants of bank performance across 18 
European countries between 1986 and 1989. They used a variety of profitability measures 
including before and after tax returns on total assets and the return on total equity. 
Generally, they found that market concentration has a positive impact on profitability. Lloyd-
Williams et al. (1994) found that market share was either negatively related to profit or 
insignificant when included with a three-bank concentration ratio variable (which was 
positively related to profit) in their study of Spanish banks in 1980s. The results generally 
favoured the SCP hypothesis. Molyneux and Forbes (1995) used data for banks from 18 
European countries from 1986 to 1989. Their findings also supported the traditional SCP 
approach. Their results suggest that concentration in the European banking market lowers 
the cost of collusion between firms and results in higher profits for all market participants. 
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Only a few researchers have analysed Vietnam’s banking performance using concentration 
ratio (bank sizes) from reports of the SBV. Disappointingly, most of the indices on customer 
deposits, total assets and customer loans are limited for Vietnam. The problem of data 
collection made it difficult for researchers to investigate the issue through parametric models 
or non-parametric methods. No previous study has explicitly considered Vietnam’s banking 
performance using the structural model (SCP or EH approaches). Barth et al. (2001) is a 
valuable report about regulation and supervision of banks around the world. Building on this 
work and other sources, Kousted et al. (2005) examined the market structure of Vietnam 
using concentration ratios. He argued that the Vietnamese banking sector is less 
concentrated than that of average developing countries. The degree of government 
ownership in the Vietnamese banking sector is very high compared to both other countries in 
the region and to the average level in developing countries. Barth et al. (2004) used deposits 
of five banks in concentration ratio. He indicated that a higher degree of state ownership 
tends to be associated with lower bank efficiency, less saving and borrowing, lower 
productivity and slower growth. The share of deposits of the five largest banks held by 
government-owned banks was 80% before 2001 (when they accounted for only 10% of the 
total of banks at that time). Barth et al. (2004) also found that tighter entry restrictions tend 
to increase overhead costs; the likelihood of a major banking crisis is positively associated 
with greater limitations on foreign bank participation.  
 
In general, bank structure in Vietnam has not been analysed for a large number of banks and 
long period of time using parametric or non-parametric methods. Hence we extend the 
current research of Vietnamese bank structure in several ways. Firstly, we use three factors, 
customer deposits, total assets and customer loans, in either 3-bank or 5-bank ratios that 
reflect features of the Vietnamese banking system but have not been employed by previous 
studies. Secondly, we model and estimate revenue over total assets, interest income and 
profit before tax over total assets as the dependent variables. We will try to show, using the 
structural models, how the profitability measure is affected by market concentration 
(Structure-Conduct-Performance) or market share (Efficiency Hypothesis). Moreover, this is 
the first time that an extensive panel data set has been employed to examine the 
10 
 
Vietnamese banking system. Our data set includes48 Vietnamese commercial banks over the 
period 1999 to 2009.  
 
4. Methodology and data 
 
 
Concentration-profitability in the SCP model will be employed to consider the banking 
structure of Vietnam. The motivation of this section is to answer the question of whether the 
Vietnamese banking market is collusive or efficient. An important contribution we make to 
the structural method is that we use 6 measures of CR based on the three factors, customer 
loans, total assets and customer deposits in both 3-bank and 5-bank ratios. No previous 
study of the Vietnamese banking system, such as Barth et al. (2001, 2004), has used all 6 
measures. Barth et al. (2001, 2004) and Kousted et al. (2005) employed only 5-bank 
customer deposit measures in their research of concentration ratio. Variables that capture 
other environmental factors such as capital/assets, loans/deposits and the number of 
branches are included in our model to account for risks, cost and size. Following Weiss 
(1974), Smirlock (1985), Lloyd-Williams et al. (1994) and Molyneux and Forbes (1995) we will 
test the performance of the Vietnamese banking system by estimating the profit equation 
below: 
 
 
∑
=
+++=
n
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itjjtitit ZaCRaMSaa
3
,210pi  (1) 
 
 
where itpi  is a measure of bank i’s profit in period t, itMS  is a measure of market share, tCR  
denotes market concentration and itjZ ,  is a vector of j control variables which are included 
to account for firm-specific and market-specific characteristics. From (1), if: 
 
• 01 >a and 02 =a : banks with a relatively high market share are more efficient than 
their rivals and earn rents because of this efficiency while increased market 
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concentration does not result in banks earning any monopoly rents. This supports the 
efficiency hypothesis. 
• 01 =a and 02 >a :market share does not affect bank rents and rents reflected in higher 
profitability are monopoly rents that result from increased market concentration. This 
supports the traditional SCP hypothesis (Smirlock, 1985). 
 
For testing purposes, we cast model (1) in empirical form, as follows: 
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where, )ln(
,tiROA is the natural logarithm of the return on assets (used to measure a bank’s 
performance). We consider three measures of performance )(
,tiROA as follows: the natural 
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,1ln .4Market share ( )tiMS ,  is measured as the percentage of 
industry sales of a particular company or product and captures bank efficiency (Smirlock, 
1985; Molyneux and Forbes, 1995). We use the following 3 measures of market share: the 
total loans of bank i divided by total banking sector loans in year t (MS-CL), the total assets of 
bank i divided by total banking sector assets in year t (MS-TA) and the total deposits of bank i 
divided by total banking sector deposits in year t (MS-CD). The concentration ratio ( )tCR  
indicates the relative size of the largest firms in relation to their industry as a whole. We 
consider 6 measures of market concentration based on three-bank and five-bank loans, 
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assets and deposits. The control variables ( )itjZ ,  are included to account for other risk, cost, 
size and ownership characteristics. Since the performance measure, tiROA , , is not risk 
adjusted, we will employ the two following variables to account for firm-specific risk, the 
capital to total asset ratio 







ti
ti
TA
TC
,
,
and the customer loans to customer deposits ratio 







ti
ti
CD
CL
,
,
,see Lloyd-Williams et al.(1994) and Molyneux and Forbes (1995). )(
,tiTALn is the natural 
logarithm of a bank’s asset size which is included as a control variable to account for cost and 
capital ratio differences related to bank size and to control for the possibility that large banks 
are likely to have greater product and loan diversifications than smaller banks. This increased 
diversification implies less risk and hence a lower required rate of return (Smirlock, 1985). 
)ln(
,tiBR is the natural logarithm of the number of bank branches.  
 
In this paper, annual individual balance sheets and income statements of 48 Vietnamese 
commercial banks from 1999 to 2009 have been collected from the SBV, Bloomberg, National 
Library of Vietnam and individual banks. This data set accounts for more than 90% of total 
customer loans, total customer deposits and total assets. Five of the 48 banks are SOCBs, five 
are JVCBs, one is a foreign commercial bank (FCB) and the remaining 37 are JSCBs. Several 
banks established in 2008 and 2009 are included in the data. The number of records ranged 
from a low of 17 banks in 1999 to a high of 46 in 2009. Banks also have differing frequencies 
of years in the data – see Table 1. There are sixteen banks with data for all years; twelve 
banks with 4–8 years of data; fourteen banks with 5–7 years of data and five banks with 2–4 
years of data (of which three banks were established in 2008 and one bank was founded in 
2006). Only one bank (which was transformed from a branch of a foreign bank to a foreign 
commercial bank in 2008) has one year of data.  
 
5. Empirical results 
 
Table 3 to Table 5 report the estimated revenue and profit equations using the various 
concentration ratio (CR) and market share (MS) measures for the full sample. Table 3 reports 
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the results for the CR and MS measures based on customer loans while Table 4 and Table 5 
give the results using measures based on total assets and customer deposits, respectively. All 
models are estimated using the cross-sectional fixed-effects estimator
5
. 10H refers to the F-
test of the null hypotheses that cross-sectional fixed-effects are redundant. All of the F-tests 
reject the exclusion of cross-sectional fixed-effects and so the one-way fixed-effects model is 
favoured and used for inference. In addition to the CR and MS covariates are the control 
variables. The R
2 
(denoted R2) and Adjusted R
2
 (Adj. R2) are reported below the control 
variables. The F-statistic (F-sta.) testing the overall explanatory power of the model and 
number of observations (Obs.) are given at the bottom of the tables. 
 
For the full sample (Tables 3 to 5), the coefficients on CR are always negative and generally 
significantly different from zero while those on MS are always insignificant.
6
Hence, MS does 
not affect banks’ revenue, interest income or profit before tax and so banks with a higher 
market share are not earning greater profits because they are more efficient. Further, CR 
generally has an unexpected negative (or zero) effect on a bank’s revenue and profit before 
tax. This does not support the notion that profitability is raised due to collusive behaviour 
resulting from increased concentration. Thus, our results do not support either the 
traditional SCP or efficiency hypotheses. However, our results could suggest that the business 
strategies of Vietnamese banks during this period were focussed on raising capital, loans, 
assets, deposits, branch networks and reducing non-performing loans. In this case banks 
appear to focus on increasing their size (loans, deposits, assets, branch networks) and other 
services (stock exchange, derivative products, internet banking, phone banking, credit cards 
and ATM). Thus, revenue, interest income and profit are not the most propriety missions of 
banks. 
 
                                                           
5
We cannot apply the two-way fixed-effects estimator (including both time period and cross-sectional fixed 
effects) because the CR variable (which only varies through time) would be perfectly collinear with the period 
fixed effects. Unreported pooled OLS estimates of the models are available upon request. These are not 
reported in the tables because the fixed-effects estimator is always preferred to the pooled OLS estimator. 
6
 In 11 (14) out of the 18 regressions CR is negative and significant at the 5% level (10%) level. CR is always 
negative and insignificant using the customer loans measure (Table 3) and generally significant using customer 
deposits (Table 5). Using the total assets (Table 4) measure CR is often insignificant. 
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Regarding the other variables, TC/TA is always positive and statistically significant. This 
implies that the capital/asset ratio has a positive relation with revenue, interest income and 
profit before tax. In reality, all the banks increased their capital due to the Decree No. 
141/2006/CP of the government
7
. CL/CD is insignificant in all the models. LN(TA) is negative 
and significant when LN(REVTA) and LN(INT/TA) are the dependent variables and the CRs are 
measured using customer deposits and customer loans. In contrast, LN(TA) is insignificant 
when CRs are measured with total assets and when LN(1+PBT/TA) is the dependent variable. 
LN(BR) is always positive and sometimes statistically significant. Hence, there is some 
evidence that revenue and profit also grow when banks increase the number of their 
network branches. 
 
 
Table 6 summarises the unreported estimation results (available from the authors on 
request) for the full sample and the 4 sub-samples:1999–2003; 2004–2009; five SOCBs and 
43 non-SOCBs. The results for the full-sample are similar to the sub-sample for 2004-2009 
and for 43 non-SOCBs in that there is generally no relation between MS and revenue, interest 
income and profit before tax while there is a negative relation between CR and all three 
dependent variables (although the evidence is more ambiguous). Further, revenue, interest 
income and profit before tax of Vietnamese banks increase when CR decreases for the 
samples 1999-2009, 2004-2009 and non-SOCBs. For the sub-sample 1999 – 2003 both CR and 
MS are generally insignificant with the models using total assets and customer deposits. CR 
and MS are often negative and significant with the models based upon the customer loans 
measures. Generally, banks’ revenue, interest income and profit are not from loans but other 
sources such as derivative products, international settlements, credit cards and other 
services. When banks expand their loans from 2004 to 2009, revenue and interest income 
decrease. There is almost no relation between CR and revenue, interest income and profit 
before tax for the five SOCBs, while MS is significant and has a negative relation with revenue 
and interest income but not with profit before tax. Regarding the control variables, TC/TA is 
positive and significant. CL/CD and LN(TA) are generally insignificant or negative and 
significant
8
. The effect of LN(BR) differs depending on the samples. Overall, our results do not 
                                                           
7
To guarantee the competitive ability of domestic banks after joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), the 
government issued Decree No. 141/2006/CP dated 22
nd
 November 2006 to define legal capital for commercial 
banks as 1,000 billion VND and 3,000 billion VND in 2008 and 2010 respectively. 
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support either the traditional (SCP) or efficiency hypothesis (EH) for the sub-samples or the 
full sample. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This study has examined the SCP and EH models in order to analyse the Vietnamese banking 
system. The SCP hypothesis is the approach through which the influence of market structure 
on firms’ performance is examined (Goddard et al., 2001). If the banking industry is almost 
monopolistic the degree of competition is low and banks can indulge in collusive behaviour. 
Consequently, a reinforcement of regulation on the part of the government would be 
recommended in order to prevent the abuse of market power by a small number of firms. In 
contrast, the method developed by members of the Chicago school, such as Demsetz (1973), 
is the EH. According to this approach a positive relationship between concentration and 
profitability does not necessarily reflect collusive behaviour by several firms rather it shows 
that large firms come to earn high profits by performing efficiently. According to this concept 
the profitability measure is affected not by market concentration but by market share, 
because efficient firms can increase their market share and earn high profits even in a 
competitive and low-concentration market. This idea implies that the governmental 
regulation and intervention are inappropriate policies since they might impose penalties on 
efficient firms and discourage the proper functioning of the market mechanism. We also note 
that there were no substantial studies that applied the SCP and EH structural models to the 
Vietnamese banking system. The problem of data collection has made it difficult for 
researchers to investigate the issue through parametric models or non-parametric methods.  
 
In terms of the empirical contribution to the international research, our study is the first time 
that the concentration ratio (CR), Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and concentration-
profitability models (SCP and EH) have been employed to explain the performance of the 
Vietnamese banking system. We do this by considering a sample of the whole banking 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
8
 CL/CD is negative and statistically significant when the dependent variables are LN(REV/TA) and LN(INT/TA) in 
the sub-sample 2004-2009, which indicates that loan/deposit ratio has a negative impact on revenue and 
interest income from 2004 to 2009. 
16 
 
system and the following sub-samples: SOCBs and non-SOCBs from 1999 to 2009. Further, 
we apply all three measures of market share and concentration ratio based upon customer 
deposits, total assets and customer loans and that use both 3-bank and 5-bank concentration 
ratios. Previous studies for other countries used just one single concentration ratio variable 
such as 3-bank (Lloyd-Williams et al., 1994) or 10-bank (Molyneux and Forbes, 1995) 
measures. Secondly, we model and estimate revenue over total assets, interest income and 
profit before tax over total assets as the dependent variables. All the previous studies 
employed only profit before tax over total assets as the dependent variable of the model.  
 
Our empirical results show that the Vietnamese banking industry was substantially less 
concentrated over the period 1999-2009 as both the CR and HHI fell. This suggests that the 
banking industry became more competitive. Small and medium banks have performed better 
in the 2000s but they might not compete against large banks. The increase in the number of 
banks and decreased market concentration may suggest that banking service choice is 
increasing. The estimated structural models do not, in general, support either traditional SCP 
or efficiency hypotheses. It could be that the business strategies of large Vietnamese banks 
during this period were focussed on raising capital, loans, assets, deposits, branch networks 
and reducing non-performing loans. Thus, revenue, interest income and profit before tax 
were not the most propriety missions of banks. 
 
We believe that the SBV needs to strengthen the regulations on the current sources of 
revenue (securities, credit cards, derivative products etc.) and set up regulations on new 
services such as securitisations. There is also a need to restructure the banking system where 
some small banks are not really efficient in the market. Hence, merger and acquisitions may 
be a popular trend in the coming years. We believe that the SBV needs to have policies for 
restructuring the system and promoting competition in the banking sector of Vietnam. 
 
Another policy implication concerns the relationship between loan and bank revenue and 
interest income from 2004 to 2009. We argued that tightening monetary policies starting in 
2008 still have a big impact on the banking system in terms of compulsory reserves, loans 
and deposits. In parallel with the speed of the country’s economic development, the loan 
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growth rate grew dramatically. As the loan growth rate is higher than the deposit growth 
rate, commercial banks have to use sources such as the inter-bank market to meet borrowing 
demands. The misuse of this capital resource causes a serious imbalance in the capital 
structure and implicates high liquidity risk in the banking system. Moreover, when the 
inflation rate and deficit in trade balance have become more serious, the government used 
traditional tightening of monetary policy in order to reduce money supply circulation – the 
main reason for high inflation. Generally, the banking system encounters many difficulties, 
resulting from loss of balance in the source and use of funds, and the rapid increase in credit 
growth. This is also supported by our empirical results when customer loans increase, 
revenue and interest income generally decrease from 2004 to 2009. Thus, the SBV needs to 
balance the high demand of loans from the public and macroeconomic policies of the 
government.  
 
Our results for Vietnam contrast with those for the USA and Europe found in previous work. 
Our results support neither the SCP or EH models for Vietnam whereas the EH is favoured for 
the USA while the European banking system generally conforms to the SCP approach. Hence, 
our results add a further interesting contrast by geographical location on this issue. 
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Figure 1 Milestones in the development of the Vietnamese banking system 
 
 
Figure 2 Non-performing loans (per cent of total outstanding loans) from 1996 to 2009 
 
Sources: Koustedet al. (2005: 43); VCSC (2007: 5) and SBV (2009). 
 
 
 
 
Table 1The number of commercial banks from 1990 to 2009
9
 
Type of banks 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 
State owned commercial banks (SOCBs) 4 4 5 5 5 
Joint stock commercial banks (JSCBs) 0 36 39 37 37 
                                                          
9
 Beside these commercial banks, there are also the Social Policy Bank and Vietnam Development Bank which are operating 
as non-profit institutions. 
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Branches of foreign banks (BFBs) 0 18 26 31 48 
Joint venture commercial banks (JVCBs) 0 4 5 5 6 
Foreign commercial banks (FCBs) 0 0 0 0 5 
Total 4 62 75 78 101 
Sources: Dufhues (2003: 32); SBV (2005, 2008, 2009) and VCSC (2008). 
 
 
Table 2CR (3 and 5 banks) and HHIfor the Vietnamese banking system from 1999 to 2009 
  Concentration ratios 
Herfindahl-Hirschman 
indices 
Year 
No. of 
banks 
CR-CL3 CR-CL5 CR-TA3 CR-TA5 CR-CD3 CR-CD5 HHI-CL HHI-TA HHI-CD 
1999 17 0.8021 0.9256 0.6916 0.9175 0.7268 0.9270 0.2270 0.2052 0.2127 
2000 22 0.7703 0.9036 0.6856 0.9069 0.6975 0.9107 0.2157 0.1990 0.2006 
2001 25 0.7839 0.8963 0.6782 0.8976 0.7023 0.8910 0.2179 0.1942 0.1988 
2002 28 0.7542 0.8921 0.5316 0.6944 0.6415 0.8587 0.2134 0.1895 0.1739 
2003 29 0.7347 0.8788 0.6772 0.8703 0.6493 0.8583 0.2198 0.1895 0.1767 
2004 40 0.7001 0.8522 0.6582 0.8395 0.6422 0.8435 0.2059 0.1780 0.1705 
2005 41 0.6741 0.8221 0.6185 0.8076 0.6327 0.8310 0.1886 0.1617 0.1643 
2006 41 0.6283 0.7733 0.5770 0.7577 0.5864 0.7940 0.1683 0.1391 0.1480 
2007 44 0.5411 0.6891 0.4770 0.6416 0.5278 0.7024 0.1314 0.1019 0.1215 
2008 46 0.5427 0.6819 0.4741 0.6372 0.5220 0.6784 0.1302 0.1016 0.1194 
2009 46 0.5066 0.6459 0.4089 0.5723 0.4555 0.6073 0.1141 0.0824 0.0972 
Note: CR range from 0 to 1; HHI range from 0.02 to 1; Sources: Financial statements of 48 Vietnamese commercial banks. 
Table 3 SCP-EH estimations of customer loans for the full sample 
 3-bank ratios 5-bank ratios 
Dependent 
variable 
LN(REV/TA) LN(INT/TA) LN(1+PBT/TA) LN(REV/TA) LN(INT/TA) LN(1+PBT/TA) 
Int. -0.00876 
(-0.01109) 
0.227958 
(0.264148) 
0.110649** 
(2.49542) 
0.736445 
(0.854233) 
0.766863 
(0.81058) 
0.091746* 
(1.871657) 
MSCL -2.27129* 
(-1.81348) 
-1.52172 
(-1.11167) 
0.070922 
(1.008386) 
-2.02182 
(-1.63068) 
 
-1.45793 
(-1.07153) 
 
0.048213 
(0.683905) 
 
CRCL -1.47917*** 
(-3.3178) 
-1.85599*** 
(-3.80902) 
-0.07293*** 
(-2.91306) 
-1.81084*** 
(-3.92338) 
-2.03773*** 
(-4.02317) 
-0.05635** 
(-2.14733) 
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TC/TA 0.486087*** 
(4.450462) 
0.474113*** 
(3.971696) 
0.04038*** 
(6.583556) 
0.460158*** 
(4.218321) 
0.458515*** 
(3.830262) 
0.04148*** 
(6.687754) 
CL/CD 0.004168 
(0.345918) 
0.010173 
(0.772382) 
-0.00074 
(-1.08687) 
0.002035 
(0.169411) 
0.008691 
(0.659231) 
-0.00067 
(-0.98481) 
LN(TA) -0.11897*** 
(-2.98007) 
-0.1281*** 
(-2.93588) 
-0.00378* 
(-1.68516) 
-0.13555*** 
(-3.38191) 
-0.13649*** 
(-3.10319) 
-0.00285 
(-1.25138) 
LN(BR) 0.083725* 
(1.699973) 
 
0.076386 
(1.419072) 
 
0.001156 
(0.418068) 
 
0.077752 
(1.593906) 
 
0.075649 
(1.413176) 
 
0.001811 
(0.652937) 
 
R2 0.512551 0.499378 0.465232 0.512551 0.501861 0.458888 
Adj. R2 0.432319 0.416978 0.377211 0.432319 0.419869 0.369823 
1
0H  
4.102543*** 
Reject 
 
3.817154*** 
Reject 
1.624488*** 
Reject 
4.208418*** 
Reject 
3.852561*** 
Reject 
1.565254** 
Reject 
F-sta. 6.388336 6.060381 5.28548 6.55246 6.120869 5.152277 
Obs. 376 376 376 376 376 376 
Note: All models are estimated using the fixed-effects estimator with cross-sectional fixed-effects (only). R2 denotes the coefficient of 
determination, Adj. R2 the adjusted coefficient of determination,
1
0H  is an F-test for the significance of the fixed-effects, F-sta. tests the null 
that R2 is equal to zero and Obs. denotes the number of observations used in estimation. The variables’ coefficients and t-statistics (in 
brackets) are reported in the table; *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level and * significance at the 10% 
level. Source for the data are the financial statements of 48 Vietnamese commercial banks. 
 
Table 4 SCP-EH estimations of total assets for the full sample 
 3-bank ratios 5-bank ratios 
Dependent 
variable 
LN(REV/TA) LN(INT/TA) LN(1+PBT/TA) LN(REV/TA) LN(INT/TA) LN(1+PBT/TA) 
Int. -1.65102*** 
(-2.7175) 
-2.33356*** 
(-3.48936) 
0.03952 
(1.175122) 
-1.65692*** 
(-2.68334) 
-2.26849*** 
(-3.33969) 
0.051258 
(1.503601) 
MSTA -1.57601 
(-1.40174) 
 
-1.26957 
(-1.02582) 
 
-0.00116 
(-0.01861) 
 
-1.58309 
(-1.40541) 
 
-1.22971 
(-0.99242) 
 
0.006226 
(0.100114) 
 
CRTA -0.60241* 
(-1.8943) 
 
-0.36224 
(-1.03481) 
 
-0.02964* 
(-1.68398) 
 
-0.48961* 
(-1.8338) 
 
-0.33187 
(-1.12998) 
 
-0.03066** 
(-2.07998) 
 
TC/TA 0.573109*** 
(5.247869) 
0.601891*** 
(5.006929) 
0.043582*** 
(7.20953) 
0.578231*** 
(5.312729) 
0.602083*** 
(5.02886) 
0.043328*** 
(7.210775) 
CL/CD 0.007309 
(0.599899) 
0.016223 
(1.209669) 
-0.00051 
(-0.74861) 
0.007481 
(0.614099) 
0.016169 
(1.206552) 
-0.00052 
(-0.7791) 
LN(TA) -0.05701 
(-1.50241) 
-0.03535 
(-0.8463) 
-0.00141 
(-0.67276) 
-0.05491 
(-1.4566) 
-0.0366 
(-0.88263) 
-0.00175 
(-0.84113) 
LN(BR) 0.092115* 
(1.888787) 
 
0.104564* 
(1.947792) 
 
0.002791 
(1.03392) 
 
0.091437* 
(1.872354) 
 
0.103469* 
(1.926077) 
 
0.002637 
(0.978185) 
 
R2 0.489937 0.468632 0.456293 0.489583 0.468971 0.458777 
Adj. R2 0.405982 0.381171 0.366801 0.405571 0.381566 0.369693 
1
0H  
3.684576*** 
Reject 
3.470895*** 
Reject 
1.535956** 
Reject 
3.681292*** 
Reject 
3.469094*** 
Reject 
1.541916** 
Reject 
F-sta. 5.835745 5.358178 5.098699 5.827494 5.365469 5.149972 
Obs. 376 376 376 376 376 376 
See note to Table 3. 
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Table 5SCP-EH estimations of customer deposits for the full sample 
 3-bank ratios 5-bank ratios 
Dependent 
variable 
LN(REV/TA) LN(INT/TA) LN(1+PBT/TA) LN(REV/TA) LN(INT/TA) LN(1+PBT/TA) 
Int. -0.65301 
(-0.80502) 
-0.84286 
(-0.94872) 
0.070327 
(1.564452) 
0.276912 
(0.337812) 
0.051229 
(0.056954) 
0.041071 
(0.890419) 
MSCD -0.79959 
(-0.65617) 
 
-0.37716 
(-0.2826) 
 
-0.00179 
(-0.02652) 
 
-0.33625 
(-0.28004) 
 
0.061599 
(0.046753) 
 
-0.02044 
(-0.3025) 
 
CRCD -1.34714** 
(-2.56093) 
 
-1.4553** 
(-2.52601) 
 
-0.05449 
(-1.8692) 
 
-1.59015*** 
(-3.7907) 
 
-1.65446*** 
(-3.59429) 
 
-0.02597 
(-1.10031) 
 
TC/TA 0.540598*** 
(4.910592) 
0.547763*** 
(4.543071) 
0.042774*** 
(7.011166) 
0.509278*** 
(4.685357) 
0.518012*** 
(4.34314) 
0.043978*** 
(7.190282) 
CL/CD 0.005236 
(0.429257) 
0.013002 
(0.973282) 
-0.00057 
(-0.83748) 
0.002668 
(0.220821) 
0.010484 
(0.790754) 
-0.00052 
(-0.75783) 
LN(TA) -0.09078** 
(-2.21662) 
-0.08627* 
(-1.9234) 
-0.00226 
(-0.99619) 
-0.11992*** 
(-2.96281) 
-0.11408** 
(-2.56863) 
-0.00122 
(-0.53494) 
LN(BR) 0.08308* 
(1.692808) 
 
0.087907 
(1.635438) 
 
0.002235 
(0.821693) 
 
0.070939 
(1.461514) 
 
0.076266 
(1.431937) 
 
0.002636 
(0.965075) 
 
R2 0.492568 0.476676 0.457847 0.504351 0.486892 0.454017 
Adj. R2 0.409047 0.390539 0.36861 0.422769 0.402437 0.36415 
1
0H  
3.734417*** 
Reject 
 
3.506048*** 
Reject 
1.548419** 
Reject 
3.917612*** 
Reject 
3.624747*** 
Reject 
1.533396** 
Reject 
F-sta. 5.897504 5.533919 5.130719 6.182145 5.765065 5.052111 
Obs. 376 376 376 376 376 376 
See note to Table 3. 
 
 
 
Table 6 Summary of the results from the structural model 
 Majority Minority  Majority Minority 
   Full sample   
   CR (-)  
   MS (0)  
1999-2003   2004-2009   
CR (0) (-) CRCL5 and LN(1+PBT/TA) CR (-) (0) CRCD3; LN(1+PBT/TA) 
MS (0) (-) CRCL with LN(REV/TA) and 
LN(INT/TA) 
MS (0)  
SOCBs   Non-SOCBs   
CR (0) CRCD3 CR (-) (0) CRTA; CRCD3 with 
LN(REV/TA) and LN(INT/TA) 
MS (-) (0) CRCD and CRCL with 
LN(1+PBT/TA) 
MS (0)  
Note: (0) insignificant; (-) negative and significant. 
 
 
